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ABSTRACT 
 Web applications that process sensitive information have become prevalent. 
Modern web applications rely heavily on dynamic content (i.e., page updates made by the 
browser using an XMLHttpRequest, and more recently the JavaScript Fetch API). Ajax 
technology provides fast client-server communication, which generates web traffic that 
updates the document object model (DOM) object in the browser interface often induced 
by user input. Therefore, the user’s actions are strongly correlated with timing and size of 
packets that carry Ajax requests. This research aims to characterize the relationship 
between keystroke dynamics and Ajax packets in dynamic web traffic. We investigate 
several dynamic web applications and the ability to measure human behavior in 
encrypted network traffic. Two approaches to Ajax packet detection are proposed and 
evaluated: longest increasing subsequence (LIS), which uses packet sizes, and dynamic 
time warping (DTW), which uses keystroke and packet timings. From the detected 
packets of recognized patterns, we examine the extent to which remote user identification 
in dynamic web traffic can be performed. We use a recurrent neural network (RNN) 
trained with triplet loss to extract deep temporal features from the detected packet 
timings. Leveraging recent work in keystroke dynamics, we show that user identification 
can be performed with modest accuracy utilizing the packet timings invoked by a user 
typing in a web search engine. 
v 
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Privacy is a major concern of users while using the internet. User tracking and disclosure
of sensitive information are some of the threats that internet users face. Internet privacy is
the individual’s right to selectively control one’s own information on the internet, which
is based on the definition of privacy as “a right to be let alone” [1]. To protect users’
privacy on the internet, many measures have been taken, such as using encrypted networks,
anonymizing proxies, and multi-factor authentication. Nevertheless, internet privacy issues
are increasing due to the nature of the web, which is inherently open, dynamic, and prone
to information leakage [2].
Web applications that process sensitive information have become prevalent. Modern web
applications rely heavily on dynamic content (i.e., page updates made by the browser
using an XMLHttpRequest, and more recently the JavaScript Fetch application program-
ming interface (API)). To enhance user experience, most dynamic web services use the
asynchronous JavaScript and XML (Ajax) technology, which provides fast client-server
communication that generates web traffic even with only a small input from users. Ajax
is one of the prominent technologies being used to develop rich and more interactive web
applications. However, Ajax also amplifies the possible attacks in a web environment [3]
since more frequent interaction can allow unintended information leakage, for example by
revealing search engine queries. A key feature of Ajax is that it enables browsers to retrieve
data from a server more intelligently, not reloading the entire page but downloading only the
updated parts of a page, without disturbing the user’s activity. Therefore, the user’s actions
are strongly correlated with the timing and size of packets that carry even small events.
Moreover, encrypted web traffic does not eliminate the risk of this information leakage;
a surprisingly substantial amount of information may be revealed since user inputs are
exposed primarily through packet timing and size side-channels. A remote adversary can
take advantage of this kind of unintended input-based side-channel leakage in diverse ways.
This leads to serious security challenges such as device/website fingerprinting [4]–[7], user
identification [8], content extraction [9], and session hijacking [10]. Some of these issues
arise from the use of Ajax technology [3].
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Autocomplete is one of the widely used features that relies on Ajax technology. Many
websites that accept text input within a form provide an “autocomplete” feature that suggests
a pre-populated list of values based on previous aggregate user inputs and the content of
web pages [11]. Most web search engines carry autocomplete graphical user interface (GUI)
widgets that produce traffic replying to a single mouse click or a keyboard input. This traffic
contains features that may reveal each state transition within the application [12]. As a
result, an attacker can infer sensitive user inputs or server responses based on the time or
size properties of the Ajax requests on web search engines.
In this thesis, we study how the web page processes user input and invokes the requests.
Each web application has various unique web-flow vectors depending on its web API and
event processing model. The potential for information leakage through web traffic depends
on each website. While surveying potential candidates for this study, we chose the most
widely used search engine, Google Search, which provides the autocomplete feature. Based
on our analysis of website behavior, Google leaks relatively more information through Ajax
web traffic compared to other search engines.
Next, we consider what information can be found through the patterns of Ajax triggered
by user inputs. Among the user inputs, we use keystroke dynamics as a form of behavior
biometrics since it is regarded as one of the most efficient and economical means of user
identification [13]. Previous works on keystroke dynamics have mostly been conducted by
temporal features obtained on the host. We expand it to a remote scenario in which a passive
adversary is observing encrypted web traffic. An on-path remote passive adversary can
extract Ajax packets that are induced by a user typing in a search query box in a web search
engine. We examine the extent to which remote user identification can be achieved from
observing dynamic web traffic.
Diverse machine learning models have been utilized for user identification. In our study,
recurrent neural network (RNN) is suitable because it fits well with temporal data (Ajax
packet timings) and can accommodate inputs of various lengths. By leveraging recent work
in keystroke dynamics, we use an RNN trained with triplet loss, a method that learns to rank
distances between samples belonging to the same or different classes [14].
2
1.1 Research Questions
Considering the characteristics of Ajax-based web applications, the research questions that
this thesis aims to address are as follows:
• How do the dynamic web services process user input and invoke the requests?
• Is there any way to detect user input events over encrypted web traffic? How accurate
is the detection?
• How can a remote adversary take advantage of unintended input-based side-channel
leakages? How does this infringe on user privacy?
1.2 Contributions
This research aims to figure out the patterns between keystroke dynamics and Ajax packets
generated from dynamic web traffic on the most widely used web search engine, Google,
which provides the autocomplete feature. From the detected packets of recognized patterns,
we examine the extent to which remote user identification can be achieved by observing
dynamic web traffic. To summarize, our contributions are:
• We discuss the characteristics of modern dynamic web traffic and how these are often
correlated with user behavior. Ajax-based web applications produce more responsive
and faster web traffic even with smaller user inputs.
• We develop a method that can automatically detect Ajax packets in search engines
and describe a general technique that can be used to match Ajax packets to user input
events. We introduce two approaches that can detect packets without checking the
payload: longest increasing subsequence (LIS) for packet sizes, and dynamic time
warping (DTW), which is a new approach achieved by leveraging keystroke and
packet timings.
• Using the detected packets, we perform both user identification and verification with
up to 500 users. We utilize a RNN trained with triplet loss to extract deep temporal
features from the detected packet timings.
• We survey several websites that are potentially vulnerable to this kind of attack.
Through the analysis of several websites and an ablation study, we propose several
mitigation measures that do not severely impact the performance of the website.
3
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews background and works related to our approach, including research on
dynamic web traffic, remote side-channel attacks, and keystroke dynamics.
Chapter 3 describes our methodology for threat model, data collection and Ajax packet
detection.
Chapter 4 discusses the user identification and verification part of our study in detail,
including feature extraction, specification of a recurrent neural network, triplet training, and
lastly, classification.
Chapter 5 provides the detailed experimental results achieved by using our approach.
Chapter 6 summarizes this work, and discusses experimental results, mitigation, and broad
implications. Lastly, it concludes the thesis and identifies areas for future work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Related Work
Various kinds of side-channel attacks inevitably lead to privacy issues using the internet.
Due to the recent increase in web use and corresponding increase in processing sensitive
user data, side-channel attacks in the web industry have been getting more attention. User
input events are captured almost in real-time and transmitted to enable the detection of
user actions, which poses a particular threat to privacy in the web environment. Even event
timestamps alone on encrypted traffic can leak a user’s behavior patterns that may reveal the
user’s identity and application contents. This means that anonymity cannot be guaranteed
because time information is leaked equally even through Tor, an overlay network designed
to obfuscate user location [15], [16].
While interacting with web applications, users generate characteristic patterns of web traf-
fic by their input events, which can be detected [17]. This interaction causes unintended
information leakage, for example by revealing search engine queries, that can threaten pri-
vacy [9]. Threats have increased with the use of Ajax technology, which supports fast and
responsive interactions. Sensitive information that can be exposed through web applications
includes the identity of user, the device that the user used, and the contents that the user
entered. This leads to serious security challenges that violate user privacy. We examine the
feasibility of whether remote user identification from dynamic web traffic can be achieved
by using such information leakage. This chapter reviews background information and works
related to our approach in the areas of dynamic web traffic, remote side-channel attacks,
and keystroke dynamics.
2.1 Dynamic Web Traffic
A web application is software that provides a service for users through a web browser.
As the use of software-as-a-service (SaaS) has increased, “thin clients” have replaced
many desktop applications used to process sensitive information in a wide range of areas.
Web applications are divided into browser-side and server-side components. Modern web
applications provide dynamic web services that can display different contents in accordance
with the user’s inputs and need, both client-side and server-side scripting, with frequent
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communication. This interactive feature inevitably exposes web traffic flows, which makes
it more vulnerable to side-channel attacks even when communicating over an encrypted
network. The architecture of the dynamic web application and threat model considered in
this work are shown in Figure 2.1. We assume that a remote passive adversary basically just
sees the encrypted traffic but does not interact with it.
Figure 2.1. Architecture of dynamic web application and threat model
Web browsers are the primary tool through which users interact with web servers. Most
modern web browsers (e.g., Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox) provide
JavaScript API that allow the browser to make hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) requests
to get or update page resources after a page has loaded. These web APIs are essential
for websites that require asynchronous processing of dynamic content, such as mapping
services, document editors, and search engines.
Web search engines provide an autocomplete feature that allows users to view recommended
suggestions while typing search queries [17]. Partially completed search queries typed by
the user on the client browser are used to predict what the user might search for, as
suggestions are updated for each printable character entered [3]. Ajax provides a means of
implementing asynchronous client-server communication to send the partially completed
queries and retrieve the list of search suggestions. This web traffic carries the user input to
the server and updates the document object model (DOM) on the client.
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As depicted in Figure 2.1, the front-end JavaScript communicates with the back-end server
by using HTTP or HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) with regards to user input events such as a
keypress [17]. Even a user input event as small as one keypress generates web traffic and
updates DOM objects in the browser interface through the API [12], which makes web
applications more interactive. When the HTTP request is transmitted to the web application
server, the server gets or updates data from the DB server and passes the result back to the
user in response to the HTTP request.
Ajax broadly refers to the ability of a web page to make asynchronous updates. The API
utilized and the way in which Ajax is implemented varies across websites. The most widely
used Ajax APIs are XMLHttpRequest (XHR) objects and the more recent Fetch API. XHR
is an event-based model that manages inputs, outputs, and states within an object. Events
are generated separately upon each state change of a request. This approach differs from
Promise-based asynchronous programming implemented by the Fetch API [18]. A Promise
is an object embedded in JavaScript intended to simplify asynchronous communication
compared to the callback functions in XHR. The Fetch API is optimized for HTTP through
the use of three interfaces: headers, requests, and responses, which correspond to the core
components of HTTP. Fetch, however, implements only a subset of XHR capabilities. Most
recent browsers are compatible with both XHR and Fetch APIs.
Considering how Ajax requests are made in reply to user input events, and ultimately
comparing keyboard event timings to packet timings, we should understand how the web
page processes user input and invokes the requests. The event processing model represents
the procedure by which the browser becomes aware of input events before making any
request [19]. Event processing models are mainly divided into callback and polling. In
a callback model, Ajax requests are made within some function registered as a callback
to an input event, such as a keypress or keyrelease DOM event. In comparison, a polling
model checks for new input at regular intervals and invokes an Ajax request when new
input is detected. We investigated which event processing model is currently used in several
search engines by setting breakpoints within the browser and tracing the path of keypress
and keyrelease events. We found that Google uses a callback registered to keypress events,
consistent with prior work and that DuckDuckGo also uses a callback registered to keypress
events, which differs from the prior work in which a callback was registered to keyrelease
events [19].
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A callback model is event-driven, which means handling events immediately will induce
the request without waiting for other events to finish. The callback process does not need
to check any changes periodically and react to the events correspondingly. For example, a
hypertext markup language (HTML) DOM keypress or keyrelease input event trigger HTTP
requests to notify the changes. The delay between input event time and request time mainly
relies on the running time of the callback function. If this running time is stable between
consecutive events, the time intervals between events are reliably conserved with packet
inter-arrival times [19]. The main benefit of using the callback model is that the application
does not have to spend any process resources to monitor the events periodically, which
means that it can work more efficiently.
In a polling model, the process monitors input events regularly at fixed time intervals,
as depicted in Figure 2.2. It saves the contents periodically using HTTP request packets
regardless of any detection of user inputs. Because the requests depend on each time cycle,
the time delay from input events to the request packet is related to the timing of the
event itself. Some multiple of the timer period closely aligns to the inter-arrival of packet
timing [19]. The choice of polling interval is important in that it can buffer multiple events
together, which would reduce network load if the time interval is optimal, whereas short
intervals will cause inefficiency and put a heavy burden on network due to unnecessary
traffic, resulting in delayed updates in the case of long intervals.
Figure 2.2. Flow of callback and polling model
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Generally, if the application is in an environment that needs fast processing or performs just
a single task, for example in gaming where real-time inputs are needed, the callback model
is the better choice. In contrast, the polling model works well in the case of lower frequency
actions such as email or message sending, file downloading, and controller input. Table 2.1
summarizes and compares the characteristics of the callback and polling models.
Table 2.1. Comparison of callback and polling model
Feature Callback Polling
number of requests same as input events less than/same
delay execution time of callback function polling rate
loop cycles not required required
environment needs faster processing comparatively slower
side-channel attacks more vulnerable less vulnerable
2.2 Remote Side-Channel Attacks
Over the last two decades, side-channel attacks have been widely studied in diverse contexts
using different forms of information that accompany the processing (i.e., timing, power
analysis, electromagnetic, and acoustic) to identify the vulnerabilities of the targets. It is
difficult to determine how a systemwill behave at the time of design [20]. According to [21],
attackers typically use patterns that arise from the design of programs used, user actions,
and the interaction between the client and the server to carry out side-channel attacks. This
means that certain patterns can characterize the side-channel information.
Figure 2.3 illustrates a taxonomy of side-channel attacks.We categorize remote side-channel
attacks in terms of three classes: kinds of side-channel information leaks, attack targets, and
threat models. In this subsection, we discuss remote side-channel attacks in web traffic in
particular. The attacks in the other fields are discussed in the next subsection. In a network,
side-channel information leaks are related to packet metadata, such as timing or sizes, and
these can be exploited as attacks that threaten user privacy.
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Figure 2.3. Classification of side-channel attacks
2.2.1 Side-Channel Attacks in Dynamic Web Traffic
In [19], Monaco examined the feasibility of keystroke timing attacks on several popular
search engines. For the experiment, 1000 queries were collected on each of five different
search engines (Google, DuckDuckGo, Bing, Yandex and Baidu) that implement autocom-
plete, and used two web browsers (Chrome, Firefox). Based on the collected dataset, the
behavior of each website was characterized from the perspective of packet size, event pro-
cessing model, censoring and information gain. Keystrokes were recognized by the pattern
of increasing packet sizes, and the time intervals between keystrokes were well conserved
in the packet inter-arrival times on some of the search engines examined [19]. Hence, the
vulnerability of websites that generate dynamic traffic varies significantly based on the
accuracy of Ajax packet detection.
Based on the results of prior work, Monaco [9] developed an attack model called KREEP
(Keystroke Recognition and Entropy Elimination Program) to demonstrate a client-side
attack on search engines and discuss countermeasures. KREEP consists of five stages:
keystroke detection, tokenization, dictionary pruning, word identification, and beam search.
This attack only focuses on HTTP request autocomplete traffic, which means it is client
independent, and uses the differences of packet size and packet inter-arrival times. The
datasets for the experiment were collected in both Chrome and Firefox, and consisted
of a total of 16,000 queries: 4,000 queries x 2 search engines (Google, Baidu) x 2 web
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browsers. As a result, keystrokes detection was performed with nearly perfect accuracy
in both websites and browsers. Lastly, network padding, generating dummy traffic, and
merging requests were proposed for the countermeasures against the attack.
Chen et al. [12] reviewed the status and direction of side-channel information leaks in web
applications both server-side and client-side. The root causes of many side-channel vulner-
abilities are based on the fundamental design features of web applications: frequent small
interactions, stateful communication, and diversity in the contents exchanged during state
transitions. The researchers examined actual information leaks by constructing an attack on
several high-profile web applications, including health, tax, investment, and search engines.
As an example, when they used the functionality “add health records” in OnlineHealth, the
tab design revealed the record type and each tab click created a web flow.Moreover, because
of the auto-suggestion widget, the user’s actual inputs could be distinguishable by attackers
who identify the packet sizes that match the response of the suggestion lists. Unique “web
flow vectors” were obtained by clicking through different page elements. Thus, the user’s
actions can be reconstructed by attackers who identify the packet sizes that match server re-
sponses, which may carry suggestion lists and other page updates [12]. While this approach
detects Ajax events from traffic emitted by the server, our approach considers only traffic
emitted by the client.
After this research, in response to the need for countermeasures, Chen et al. [22] proposed
the automatic tool called “Sidebuster” for automated detection and quantitation of side-
channel leaks in web applications. This technique is mainly conducted on the server-side,
and needs two steps: First, analyze the information flows of web applications to detect
the interactions induced by sensitive user data between client and server; second, conduct
the dynamic examination on the network to determine the degree of information leaks
being revealed. They surveyed six applications’ interactions between client and server to
detect user information. As a result, they found that each application had idiosyncratic side-
channels. The health profile program included multiple widgets that leak information by
interactions, and the tax program had side-channels in its control flows. Some applications
exposed user actions and sensitive information through the traffic generated by interactions
(e.g., a link selection or a button click) [22]. This research is meaningful in that it proposed
the first automatic tool that can detect and quantify side-channel leaks in web application
development.
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As such, it is certain that server-side attacks are being actively conducted. Meng et al. [17]
inspected the feasibility of recovering personalized keystroke timing information by using
Google Suggestions (GS), which is one example of an interactive rich JavaScript application.
They analyzed the timing side-channel of GS by reverse-engineering the communication
model, which is made by the obfuscated JavaScript code. In their experiment, 11 partici-
pants installed a plugin on their browser to capture keystroke timings of queries and their
keystrokes were collected. As a result, the average of the inter-keystroke timing was decided
with a less than 20% error rate for each key pair with at least 20 samples. This result suggests
that typing patterns can be reconstructed by the timing of the queries over the network [17].
In our work, we demonstrate that typing speed can be recovered with much higher accuracy
on modern search engines, and that modest user identification accuracy is achieved with up
to 500 users.
In another study, Chapman et al. [23] developed a black-box crawling system that can log
web traffic on the web application, which mimics the interactions of actual users using
standard web browsers. This system produces both web states and user behaviors with
generated web traffic. They tested on several existing web applications, including search
engines, the United Kingdom’s National Health Service Symptom Checker, and Google
Health to evaluate their approach. The researchers created crawl specification files and
executed the crawlers on each application in a variety of hardware. When the crawlers
finished the examination of the web application, the researchers quantified the leaks as a
multi-class classification problem. As a result, the best accuracy rate was 96.3% on the
Bing Suggestions data set, which means they successfully identified the queries [23]. Thus,
the researchers demonstrated the automated detection of side-channel leaks by developing
their own web application crawling system.
Recently, Goetherm et al. [24] introduced a new kind of timing attack that infers the
multiplexing of network protocols and the concurrent handling of requests by applications.
Instead of depending on sequential timing, the concurrency-based timing attacks exploit the
relative difference of timing between two requests that are currently carried out. The attack
was applied in diverse areas such as web applications over HTTP/2 or Wi-Fi authentication,
and on a Tor network. For web-based timing attacks, they used the nghttp2 C library and the
TCP_CORK option to ensure that a single TCP segment contained two TLS records. After
that, they created sets of request pairs to evaluate the attack performance. In conclusion,
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they proved that the concurrency-based timing attacks not only outperform the original
timing attacks but they are being more resilient to diverse network conditions [24]. By
using concurrency, this research proposed a more powerful remote timing attack that is not
subjected to network jitter.
2.2.2 Other Remote Side-Channel Attacks
Aside from the ones already mentioned, a number of remote side-channel attacks have been
actively studied, in the context of cryptosystem or protocol implementation [25], [26], secure
shell (SSH) [27], voice over internet protocol (VoIP) [28], Skype [29], cloud domain [30]
and others. The research has demonstrated the practicality of side-channel attacks in a
variety of areas.
Brumley et al. [25] showed that the client is able to extract a Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)
private key stored on the server not only in a local network but also on virtual machines, by
measuring the time needed for an OpenSSL server to respond to the queries. The researchers
identified a vulnerability of timing attack in the implementation of OpenSSL and expanded
it to a key recovery attack of a transport layer security (TLS) server that authenticates with
ECDSA signatures [26]. In the acoustic emanations area, Asonov et al. [31] demonstrated
attacks based on emanations produced by the PC keyboard and the clicks. By leveraging the
difference between sounds, the researchers used a neural network to distinguish the keys.
Song et al. [27] studied timing attacks on SSH, which is designed to provide a secure
channel. Taking advantage of the fact that encrypted SSH packets leak the payload size and
inter-keystroke timing information, the researchers recovered users’ typing patterns from
the network traffic and developed a hidden Markov model (HMM) to predict key sequences
from the inter-packet timings. The tool developed as part of this attack, Herbivore, first
demonstrated the possibility of remote keystroke timing attacks with network traffic.
White et al. [28] unveiled privacy threats against VoIP communications by segmenting the
sequence of observed packet sizes and analyzed the extent of the adversary’s ability to
reconstruct parts of VoIP conversations. First, the study found phoneme boundaries from
the sequence of packet sizes and classified them by using their profile HMM model. After
identifying word boundaries from the flow of categorized phonemes, the researchers trans-
lated the subsequences of phonemes into English words. The result generally represented
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adequately understandable translations with respect to machine translation.
Expanded from VoIP research, Benoit Dupasqueir et al. [29] investigated information leak-
age in detail from Skype, a widely used VoIP application. They compared time series by
adopting DTW and Kalman filter algorithms to encrypted Skype traces in an ideally noise-
free environment. The accuracy was able to reach from 60% to 83%, which demonstrates
that the privacy provided by Skype is not guaranteed.
Fingerprinting is a technique to identify a device, operating system, or web browser by using
a certain attribute of the device. By calculating clock skew in device hardware, Kohno et al.
[4] studied the remote physical device fingerprinting area without the fingerprinted device’s
known cooperation. They mostly used a transmission control protocol (TCP) timestamp-
based approach because most systems use TSopt clocks that operate at lower frequencies
than the internet control message protocol (ICMP) replay messages, which include 1,000
Hz clocks. For fingerprinting to work, two fundamental properties are needed: each different
device has a measurably different clock skew and clock skews are relatively constant over
time [4]. Overall, the research of Kohno et al. [4] proved that remote physical device
fingerprinting through timestamps is feasible with various methods.
Other work examined a remote website fingerprinting attack to prove the feasibility of
using remote traffic analysis to learn sensitive information. By using the ordered packet size
sequences and DTW distance metric, Gong et al. [32] developed a fingerprint detection
technique. To evaluate the detection technique, they made a training dataset of fingerprint
samples from the top 1000 US sites by Alexa while monitoring the victim’s traffic. Most of
the results showed high accuracy with low false-positive rate (maximum:0.5%), but several
sites were invulnerable to attack. The result also revealed sufficient detection ability in the
deanonymization attack. There is a limit, however, in that the study implemented a stable
fingerprint only when using the front page of the website, leaving room for future work for
dynamic web application traffic.
2.2.3 Countermeasures
Meanwhile, many studies have been conducted to develop countermeasures tomitigate these
unintended leakages and enhance privacy. Countermeasures can be largely divided into two
types: obfuscation of traffic (e.g., padding, mimicking, and morphing) and obfuscation of
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user inputs against identification exposure over encrypted traffic. HTTPOS, which stands
for HTTP/HTTPS with obfuscation, is a browser-side method proposed in [33] to prevent
the sensitive information leaks from web applications that use TCP and HTTP. This method
obfuscates encrypted traffic by modifying packet size, timing, flow size, and web object
size, which is effective for mitigating the existing attacks.
Similarly, a technique for obfuscating keystroke time intervals at the keystroke event level
was proposed in [34]. The researchers used two different methods of time interval mixing
methods to add noise to the time intervals while arriving: a delay mix and an interval mix.
A delay mix adds a random delay to the event time while an interval mix adds a random
delay to the time interval from the prior event. Both ways were tested by using publicly
available keystroke datasets. They could get the results that led to about a 20 to 50%
reduction of identification accuracy, but a much longer time lag was needed for the lower
ability to identify users. In conclusion, the result in this work suggests that it is feasible
to obfuscate keystroke behavior with a delay without the user noticing, which provides
a direction for a more robust defense mechanism. As recent related work implies, each
vulnerability and mitigation measure related to side-channel attacks is generally specific to
individual application functionality. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate side-channel leaks
in dynamic web applications that provide diverse functions such as an autocomplete, remote
document editing, chat applications, and mapping services.
2.3 Keystroke Dynamics
As a form of behavioral biometrics, keystroke dynamics has been regarded as one of the
most efficient and economical means of user identification [13]. Keystroke dynamics capture
typing behaviors believed to be distinctive to an individual and hard to duplicate [35].
However, the accuracy of keystroke biometric systems struggles to compete with traditional
biometrics, such as face and fingerprint. Only recently have keystroke biometric systems
been able to scale up to thousands of users and approach the accuracy needed for wide
usage deployment [36].
We can obtain mainly two kinds of information from keystroke dynamics: temporal and
spatial. Temporal information leverages the sequence of keystroke timings such as keypress
(C?) and keyrelease (CA) [37]. Such information uses either temporal features of individual
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keys or time intervals between key pairs [37]. On the other hand, the spatial information
exposes exactly which key was entered. This study aims to identify rather than merely detect
keys used. In this work, our method of user identification is based on the temporal features of
users’ typing patterns as seen through Ajax request packets. Idiosyncratic typing behaviors,
including the temporal dynamics observed through the keyboard, are used to distinguish
between users.
Keystroke biometric systems are also largely categorized as either fixed-text or free-text.
Fixed-text systems are those in which a pre-defined string is typed, such as a username,
password, or personal identification number (PIN). In comparison, free-text systems are
designed to identify or verify users typing any text. Prior work on free-text systems utilize
timing features based on the interval between keypress and release events (i.e., the duration
a key is held down), as well as the latency between consecutive keypresses (i.e., the flight
time between successive keystrokes). In many works, these features are conditioned either
on particular keys or key groups [13], [36], [38].
Tappert et al. [35] examined the long-text input for keystroke biometric system as a way of
identification and authentication. A K nearest neighbors (KNN) classifier with Euclidean
distance was employed for both identification and authentication and achieved sufficient
accuracy. The researchers utilized 239 feature measurements, which characterized a user’s
keypress duration times, transition times and typing speed, among other factors. They could
extract diverse features from the keystroke dynamics. They also figured out that reasonably
accurate user identification can be obtained from the input of 300 keystrokes [35]. In our
work, we scaled the size of each sample (both training and testing) to 300 Ajax packets,
which corresponds to 300 keystrokes.
Acien et al. [36] developed a user authentication system, TypeNet, for free-text keystrokes
based on a Siamese RNN architecture. This approach was effective when scaling up to
100,000 users, achieving close to a 5% error rate on average. It outperformed previous state-
of-the-art algorithms and approaches the performance of fixed-text systems. We leverage
a variant of the TypeNet model developed in [36] and show that user identification can be
performed by utilizing the packet timings induced by a user typing into a search engine. We
extend the work of [36] by discretizing keypress time intervals through rounding to reduce
noise introduced by packet jitter, introducing an embedding layer in the model, and training
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the model using a triplet loss.
Recently, Whiskerd et al. [39] examined the ability to utilize keystroke biometrics on web
search engine traffic from desktop computers and mobile devices. They conducted the
experiment in two scenarios: one on encrypted network traffic by using packet metadata,
and the other with decrypted traffic through an HTTP proxy (mitmproxy). The researchers
used a short fixed-text dataset consisting of 7-30 keystrokes per sample and leveraged only
packet timing for user identification. The test cases showed that it is feasible to distinguish
users in a small group by using conventional machine learning classifiers (naive Bayes,
KNN). The identification performance resulted in error rates of 5-24% depending on the
scenario [39]. Compared to this, we leverage a much larger group of 500 users and up to 300
keystrokes of free-text aggregated over several search queries that occur within the same
TCP connection.
Our approach differs from the previous works in three important ways. 1)We utilize only the
timing of Ajax packets, which correspond to keypress timings; therefore, duration features
cannot be taken because keyrelease timings are not available. 2) The key name is not known,
and the only information available is the sequence of Ajax packet timings; therefore, timings
cannot be conditioned on different keys. This scenario is most similar to [40], which uses
only a sequence of keypress time intervals to identify users. 3) Our sequence-based feature
extraction model can be leveraged for both user identification and verification scenarios.
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This chapter introduces our methodology and the measurement setup for extracting user
behavior over the encrypted network traffic. This research has two goals: 1) to figure out
the patterns between keystroke dynamics and Ajax packets from dynamic web traffic; 2)
to examine the extent to which remote user identification in dynamic web traffic can be
performed from the detected packets of recognized patterns. We consider Google Search,
the most widely used web search engine that provides the autocomplete feature, for the
experiment.
We first build a system that can replay pre-recorded keystrokes with precise timing and
capture the corresponding keystrokes and packets. We show that the Ajax request packets
can be distinguished from other background traffic. The adversary can monitor and analyze
this flow remotely from the victim accessing a website with dynamic content while the
system we built replays and records keystrokes. Then, we develop and train an RNN that
extracts a vector of deep temporal features from a sequence of timestamps.
Figure 3.1. Overview of methodology
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The overview of methodology is illustrated in Figure 3.1., which is divided into four parts:
threat model, data collection, Ajax packet detection, and user identification. We explain
each part in more detail in this chapter. User identification is discussed in detail in the next
chapter.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume a remote passive adversary that can eavesdrop on encrypted network traffic from
the victim accessing a website with dynamic content. The traffic includes packets emitted
by the victim typing search queries into GS as well as other background traffic. We assume
that the TCP connection over which Ajax requests are sent is maintained over the course
of several search queries, which we verified to be the case for all major web browsers. The
adversary can detect the Ajax packets by inferring the patterns of the packet size through
the observed TLS traffic.
Detecting Ajax packets over a TCP connection rather than individual page loads enables
an attacker to acquire keypress timings that potentially span multiple search queries. This
obviates the need to detect individual page loads, which is difficult in practice [7], [41].
Therefore, we assume that the victim does not close and reopen the browser while entering
several consecutive search queries. In this case, the browser will utilize the same TCP
connection based on the HTTP persistent connection, which permits multiple requests and
responses to be sent to over a single TCP connection instead of creating a new connection
for each request.
The concept of HTTP/2 multiplexing is shown in Figure 3.2. The HTTP/2 protocol allows
multiple concurrent requests and responses to be multiplexed within a single TCP connec-
tion [42]. HTTP/2 multiplexing is supported by most modern browsers, including Google
Chrome, which we used for the experiment. The adversary attempts to identify users by first
detecting Ajax packets within a TCP connection and then extracting a vector of temporal
features from the Ajax packet timings. These features are relatively unique to individual
users, enabling the observer to perform user identification (i.e., link the identities of two
different TCP connections).
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Figure 3.2. HTTP/2 multiplexing traffic
3.3 Data Collection
We used a subset of a large-scale dataset of typing behavior containing over 136 million
keystrokes that were collected from 168,000 users observed by Aalto University during
three months [43]. The size of the Aalto dataset is approximately 5GB, and the sentences
typed by users ranged from 15 to about 150 keystrokes, including Space and Backspace. The
sentences were randomly chosen from the Enronmobile email corpus and English Gigaword
Newswire corpus. Each user typed 15 sentences totaling 810 characters on average. The
dataset contains a wide variety of typing speeds, ranging from 1.5 to 22 keystrokes per
second. The dataset was saved in comma separated values (CSV) file format with five
columns: user, session, press time, release time, and keycode.
From this dataset, we randomly chose 500 users with 15 sessions and at least 600 keystrokes
total. This subset of keystrokes is replayed in real time using a setup thatmimics a user typing
a search query in a browser. Data from the remaining users with at least 600 keystrokes
each are used to train a model that extracts deep temporal features from a sequence of
timestamps. This model is then applied to the 500 independent users. Note that we excluded
function keys, such as Ctrl and Alt, from the dataset since these typically do not result in
Ajax requests and can unintentionally invoke keyboard shortcuts.
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The process for data collection is summarized in Figure 3.3. Data collection was performed
over approximately five days on an Intel NUC10FNK running Ubuntu 20.04 long term
support (LTS). We replayed keystrokes from the 500 users dataset by emitting keypress and
keyrelease events in real time through the uinput module [44]. The uinput module is a kernel
module that enables the creation of virtual devices and emulation of device inputs from the
user space by writing to the /dev/uinput device. These events trigger interrupts as if they
were generated by an actual keyboard and propagate to the application with the input focus,
which is a web browser in our case. We used Selenium Driver for the automatic control
of both Chrome(v.87) and Firefox(v.84). For each session, the web browser was opened
and https://www.google.com was loaded by the browser through Selenium Driver.
After loading the web page, the network capture was started by running TShark in the
background. Tshark is a command-line interface capable of the same functions achievable
withWireshark and used for capturing packets while replaying keystrokes. Both packets and
keystrokes used the epoch time with millisecond resolution, which is the standardized time
that reflects the number of seconds that have passed since 00:00:00 coordinated universal
time (UTC) on 1 January 1970.
Figure 3.3. The capture process
TShark created *.pcap fileswhich included background traffic in addition to theAjax packets
generated during the capture. A two-second delay occurred before replaying keystrokes, and
each session was saved as a separate pcap file after finishing the replay. Packet timestamps in
epoch format and TCP segment lengthswere obtained from each pcap file. The TCP segment
lengths were used for Ajax packet detection and the timestamps for user identification.
Because we are interested only in upstream traffic, we filtered based on the source client IP
address. Without loss of generality, additional background traffic is omitted, including TCP
ACKs and HTTP/2 PING packets, both of which have a distinct segment length. In total,
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we recorded traffic from 15,000 search queries (500 users x 15 sessions x 2 browsers). An
overview of data collection is described in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Data collection overview
Subjects Contents
Data collection duration 5 days
Number of users 500
Number of sessions 15
Number of browsers 2
Average number of keystrokes per user 710
Average number of keystrokes per session 48
The captured pcap was converted to CSV format to compare with the keystrokes. We used a
Python script with the TShark command for conversion. We extracted only epoch time and
packet size that were needed for Ajax packet detection and saved it as 2-tuple. Figure 3.4
is an example of a CSV file of extracted features. The features were chosen because user
inputs are exposed primarily through packet timing and size side-channels.
Figure 3.4. Head of CSV with 2-Tuple
3.4 Ajax Packet Detection
Ajax packet detection is performed over an entire TCP session, which enables aggregating
keystrokes from multiple search queries. We use the approach of detecting the Ajax packets
through the patterns of packet sizes: if the packet size increases cumulatively according to
the user’s typing on the website, the Ajax packets can be detected by finding the LIS of
23
packet sizes within the TCP connection since background traffic generally does not exhibit
this behavior. This approach achieves near-perfect Ajax packet detection accuracy (F-score
> 0.99) without the use of Delete or Backspace keys [19].
To measure the detection accuracy of the LIS approach and check the ground truth, we
decrypt the TLS connection (all traffic collected is HTTPS) and inspect the payloads. TLS
packets can be decrypted by using a pre-master secret key / RSA key or through a transparent
TLS proxy. On the client, we set the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable before each
capture which logs each TLS session key to a file. Note that this method does not work with
all cipher suites and in some cases we had to disable Diffie Hellman-based cipher suites to
force an RSA-based connection.
In addition to payload inspection, we also develop our own method to evaluate ground
truth without inspecting payloads. The way to compare the timings between keystrokes
and packets entails utilizing the concept of sequence alignment, which is a way of laying
out the timestamp sequences (host vs. packet) to identify the similarity between them. We
adapt DTW, which is used for an optimal alignment between two temporal sequences that
may vary in speed. DTW provides a non-linear alignment as well as the similarity between
two time series. The DTW approach can be useful to assess whether the website leaks the
timings of input events without performing payload inspection and can be used to measure
the accuracy of a particular detector.
The detection method determines whether the packet is an Ajax packet or not, so we
categorize it as a binary classification problem. The performance of each detection method
is measured by classification accuracy for which binary classification is a special case. The
confusionmatrix of a binary classifier is shown in Figure 3.5, where columns refer to ground
truth and rows refer to predictions made by the model.
We compare the predicted values with actual values and compute four different metrics:
true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR), FPR, and FNR.
• True Positive Rate: True positive / Actual positive
• False Positive Rate: False positive / Actual negative
• False Negative Rate: False negative / Actual positive (= 1 - TPR)
• True Negative Rate: True negative / Actual negative (= 1 - FPR)
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Figure 3.5. Definition of false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate
(FNR) for a detection system
• Accuracy: (TP+TN) / (TP+TN+FP+FN)
The TPR is the rate at which packets are correctly detected and the TNR is the rate at which
the background packets are successfully ignored. Since there is always a trade-off between
TPR and TNR, which part to put the weight on should be decided depending on the usage
of the classifier. Note that the perfect detection has TPR = TNR = 1 [37]. Generally, TPR,
TNR should be higher and FNR and FPR should be lower for the better performance. We
compare the performance of each method with Accuracy, FPR, and FNR.
3.4.1 Longest Increasing Subsequence
Given an input sequence - = 〈G1, G2, ..., G=〉 of numbers, a longest increasing subsequence
(LIS) of - is the longest subsequence where the values are increasing in value. In other
words, we look for the longest sequence of indices 81, ...8: such that
81 < 82 < ... < 8: , G [81] < G [82] < ... < G [8: ] . (3.1)
The LIS can be determined efficiently with a dynamic programming algorithm.
We have been able to confirm that the packet size pattern follows this rule on most websites,
which means that the packet size tends to increase as the characters typed into a text
input field increase. When surveying potential candidates for the experiment, we examined
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several websites: Google Search, DuckDuckGo, GoogleDocs, and Amazon. Each website
has a unique model to process input events (i.e., how it handles events, executes functions,
and whether it sets any timeout threshold). Thus, the absolute packet size and the amount of
change is different for each website and this characteristic leads to several issues that make
perfect detection difficult. Figure 3.6 is one example of Ajax packet detection by using the
LIS algorithm at Google. As we can see from Figure 3.6, the packets sizes are not strictly
following LIS, and hence, the parameter setting can be different for higher accuracy (e.g.,
contains the equal or decrease case). This especially true since our dataset includes the
Delete and Backspace keys, which can make packet sizes decrease.
Figure 3.6. An example of Ajax packet detection by using LIS algorithm
3.4.2 Dynamic Time Warping
The way to compare the temporal features between keystrokes and packets requires leverag-
ing the concept of sequence alignment. Among them, we adapted DTW, which is especially
effective for calculating a similarity between two temporal sequences that may have various
speeds. The DTW algorithm has gained popularity due to its efficiency measuring time
series similarity with different phases by allowing the elastic conversion and minimizing
the effects of shifting and distortion in time [45].
The objective of DTW is to compare two given time sequences - = G1, G2, ..G8 .., GG of
length |X| and . = ~1, ~2, ..~ 9 .., ~~ of length |Y|. A warping path , = |1, |2, ..., |: ,
<0G( |- |, |. |) ≤  < |- | + |. |, where K is the length of the warp path and : C ℎ element
of the warping path is |: = (8, 9), where i is an index from X, and j is an index from
Y [46]. The optimal warping path is the minimum-distance between two time series. By
leveraging DTW alignment combined with cross-correlation, we develop a new approach
to detect Ajax packets. Figure 3.7 describes the procedure we used. It is mainly divided into
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Figure 3.7. A procedure to detect Ajax packets using DTW alignment
three parts: data processing, sequence alignment, and comparison/selection. The detailed
explanation is as follows:
1. Data Processing
(a) Create an array of each temporal sequence:
- = [G1, G2, ..., G=] (an array of packet timing),
. = [~1, ~2, ..., ~=] (an array of keystroke press timing)
(b) Change X, Y to dense arrays that consist of 0 and 1 for comparison
(e.g., - = [0, 1, ..., 0], . = [1, 0, ..., 1] (X[G=] = 1, Y[~=] = 1))
(c) Apply a window function to each array for continuity
2. Sequence Alignment
(a) Cross-correlation: calculate the “latency” between two arrays
(b) Brute force: calculate the distance between each pair of two arrays and set the
“threshold” (referring to latency at 2-(a)) to extract packets
(c) DTW: calculate the optimal warping path using the latency at 2-(a).
3. Comparison / Selection
(a) Extract the pairs for which the distances are smaller than the threshold at 2-(b).
(b) Compare 3-(a) and 2-(c) and make a final choice for Ajax packets
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Cross-correlation is another method that is used to compare two different time series and
determine how well they match each other. Note that the size of the window function and
threshold should be different depending on each input. As a result of our experiment, we
were able to detect Ajax packets accurately by leveraging the DTW approach on most
websites. However, this approach did not work well with fast typing speed because of the
threshold of auto-saving / autocomplete (about 300ms) in the case of GoogleDocs and
DuckDuckGo.
Figure 3.8 is an example of Ajax packet detection achieved by the DTW approach from
one of the evaluation datasets: (a) an optimal warping path between packets and keystrokes,
(b) a linear graph with (packet timing - latency) and keypress timing, (c) a distribution of
difference between packet and keypress timing, and (d) a distribution of difference between
packet and keypress timing (histogram). This result shows the relation between packet and
keypress timing for Google Search, which means they are well preserved under a constant
delay time, though there is some noise.
Through the procedure to detect Ajax packets by using DTW alignment on Google Search,
we determined that the average delay betweenmatched events in each sequence is from 10ms
to 15ms (i.e., packets are emitted roughly 10ms after keypress events). This calculated delay
was almost consistent with the delay from the actual ground truth. We can observe that
packet timing is almost consistent with keypress timing after subtracting a delay, which
is described in Figure 3.8 (b). Figure 3.8 (c), (d) describes the offset between packet and
keypress timings that are matched with the optimal warping path, including background
packets.
Therefore, we use this approach as another source of ground truth to evaluate the LIS
approach and find that LIS compared to DTW has a more than 90% true positive rate in
detection. Inspecting failure cases reveals that errors arise when typing speed exceeds a
threshold and multiple characters are merged into a single Ajax packet.
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Figure 3.8. An example of Ajax packet detection by the DTW approach
from one of the evaluation datasets: (a) an optimal warping path between
packets and keystrokes, (b) a linear graph with (packet timing-latency) and
keypress timing, (c) a distribution of difference between packet and keypress
timing, (d) a distribution of difference between packet and keypress timing
(histogram)
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In the previous chapter, we described Ajax packet detection through the patterns of packet
size side-channels identified by the LIS algorithm. In this chapter, we perform remote user
identification in dynamic web traffic from the detected packets. We discuss four steps for
user identification: feature extraction, specification of a recurrent neural network, triplet
training, and classification. We leverage the extracted packet timestamp information from
the detection to perform user identification. Feature extraction is described as the way in
which the feature vector is extracted from the raw packet timestamp information. Then,
we elaborate on our training methods in regard to RNN and triplet loss functions. Finally,
we describe how to perform user identification and verification by comparing the distance
between the embedded vectors of train/test dataset.
4.1 Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is a method of performing transformations of original features to produce
more informative and non-redundant features with the goal of representing the data in a way
that is more amenable to machine learning [47]. We build and train an RNN that extracts
a vector of deep temporal features from a sequence of timestamps. We first compute
the intervals between packet timings. Given a sequence of Ajax packet timestamps in
millisecond resolution C8 for 0 ≤ 8 ≤ # + 1, the sequence of time intervals is taken as
g8 = C8+1 − C8 (4.1)
where the sequence g has length # . This requires N+1 timestamps. Note that if the Ajax
packets corresponded exactly to keypress times, g would represent the sequence of keypress
latencies (i.e., time between successive keydown events). Because of variations in event
processing on the host and packet jitter, however, the intervals g do not exactly match the
keypress intervals that would be obtained on the host. Packet delay jitter may be caused
by various factors, such as: poor hardware performance, network congestion, and taking
different paths to the destination [48]. We consider an ideal scenario in which jitter in
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minimized by collecting traffic at the network interface of the victim. The motivation for
this is to isolate packet timing jitter to the web page only, eliminating network effects. After
that, we quantize g by rounding the intervals to the nearest increment of 1 ms, forming the







We determine the optimal 1 value as 5ms, which is large enough to eliminate most of the
jitter introduced by the web page. This allows for some variation in the Ajax packet timings
such that packet time intervals will be mapped to the same interval on the host with minor
noise introduced.
Figure 4.1. Histogram of time interval distribution: original values of g (up)
and the result after tokenization at 1 = 5ms (down)
Additionally, we analyze the time interval (g) distribution, which is depicted in Figure 4.1:
the original values of g (up) and the result after tokenization at 1 = 5ms (down).We cap g8 at
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a maximum of 2 seconds. There are two reasons why we set the maximum of 2 seconds for
the tokens, which can be observed in Figure 4.1 (a). First, most keystroke timing intervals
are below 2 seconds. Faster typists typically also demonstrate more consistent behavior
than slower typists; thus larger intervals are less indicative of user identity. Second, the
collected data has approximately 2 seconds between each search query since we combined
Ajax packets from several consecutive queries. As a result, the tokens B8 are bounded,
0 ≤ B8 ≤ 401 with 1 = 5ms. The sequence s is provided as input to a recurrent model 5 that
outputs a fixed-length vector
5 (s) = x (4.3)
where x is an L2 normalized feature vector of length 128. L2 norm ("least squares" norm)
is defined as the square root of the sum of the squares of the values in each dimension [49].
Euclidean distances between these embedded vectors form the basis for user identification
and verification.
4.2 Recurrent Architectures
An RNN is a neural network for sequential data, which maintains a hidden state as input is
fed to the network [50]. It fits well for temporal data such as time series since the inputs can
vary in length. This makes it suitable for training the dataset we used that consists of free-
text keystrokes. Figure 4.2 depicts the different recurrent architecture by the order: from
vanilla RNN, long short term memory (LSTM), bidirectional LSTM, to gated recurrent
unit (GRU).
A vanilla RNN is the most basic form of the RNN, which processes the sequence x as
an input vector by applying a recurrence formula. It consists of a single tanh activation
function and shares the parameters between units. However, an RNN is unable to handle
long-term dependencies, which means it is difficult to process by using the distant state
from the current node.
An LSTM is amodified version of an RNN that aims to solve the vanishing gradient problem
(i.e., the difficulty of learning long-term dependencies), which consists of three gates: input
gate, forget gate, and output gate. An LSTMutilizes these gates to remove or add information
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Figure 4.2. Different recurrent architectures: (a) RNN, (b) LSTM, (c) Bidi-
rectional LSTM, (d) GRU. Adapted from [51], [52].
to cell state [51] through the operation of sigmoid and tanh activation function of each gate.
A “forget gate” determines whether the past hidden output will be forgotten or not, and
an “input gate” decides which values update. Leveraging these gates, an LSTM generally
performs better than an RNN.
Unfortunately, an LSTM can only predict using past sequences, not future information. As
depicted in Figure 4.2 (c), a bidirectional LSTM solves this problem by considering both
forward and backward operations, to conduct a parallel operation. However, a bidirectional
LSTM does not always bring better performance and has the disadvantage of higher com-
putational cost. Finally, a GRU is similar to an LSTM, but simpler in that it has fewer
parameters and no output gate. A GRU utilizes two gates: a reset gate and an update gate.
It provides a reduced training time with comparable performance but normally fits better
with smaller datasets. The performance was worse than that of the LSTM in the case of our
experiment since our datasets may be comparatively larger for the GRU.
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Among the RNN architectures we discussed, the performances of the LSTM and the bidi-
rectional LSTM were similarly high; the LSTMwas slightly better. This means our datasets
do not seem to be affected by future information as much as information about the past.
Also, considering the graphics processing unit (GPU) memory and the time cost, we chose
the LSTM architecture.
The structure of our model is shown in Table 4.1. The model 5 is an RNN based on the
TypeNet model developed in [36] which contains two stacked LSTM layers of 128 units.
Note that the number of units is the dimension of the hidden state or size of the output. We
introduce an embedding layer as the first layer of the network since we tokenize the intervals.
An embedding layer uses the integers in s to index a dense matrix, a technique commonly
used in natural language processingwhere dictionary size can grow to hundreds or thousands
of tokens. We found the embedding layer to be essential to obtaining identification accuracy
with the packet timings that approaches that of using the timings measured on the host.
Table 4.1. LSTM network architecture
Layer Output Shape No. Params
Input # × 1 0
Embedding # × 16 6416
Batch Norm # × 16 64
LSTM # × 128 74240
Dropout (0.5) # × 128 0
Batch Norm # × 128 512
LSTM 128 131584
L2 Norm 128 0
To prevent the overfitting, we use batch normalization before each layer and dropout between
the LSTM layers. Batch normalization is used to normalize the activations of input volume
before going to the next layer and can be used for any set of activations in the network [53]. It
has been shown to have advantages in stabilizing the training process by reducing the number
of epochs and providing various learning rates. Dropout prevents the overfitting by changing
the network architecture through randomly dropping the connections as probability p at each
training session. We set p as 0.5, which seems to be the optimal rate.
The model is trained with approximately 117,000 users in the Aalto dataset that contain
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at least 600 keystrokes. We evaluate the model with data from the 500 users held out for
traffic capture. Because this model takes as input a single time series, only keypress timings
are utilized for training. This differs from previous work on keystroke biometric systems in
which both keypress and keyrelease timings are utilized. We train the model for 150 epochs
with adaptive moment estimation (Adam) optimizer (n=10−3, V=0.9, V2=0.999), 256 batch
size, and online semi-hard triplet mining with margin (U=1.0) [14].
4.3 Triplet Training
Triplet loss is considered one of the best-performing loss functions on embedding tasks [54]
(i.e., projecting high-dimensional data to a lower dimension). Our model is trained using
triplet loss, a method that learns to rank distances between samples belonging to the same
or different classes [14]. Triplet loss is especially effective when the number of samples per
class is small [55], and it generally performs better than training with other loss function
such as softmax, according to [56]. We choose triplet loss because we assume there are only
two samples per class in our dataset, which represent two separate TCP connections.
During each batch of training, the model is presented with triplets, each of which includes
an anchor sample(a), a positive sample(p) in the same class as the anchor, and a negative
sample(n) in a different class from the anchor. The formula of triplet loss is
Loss(0, ?, =) = max(‖ 5 (0) − 5 (?) ‖2︸                ︷︷                ︸
3 (0,?)
− ‖ 5 (0) − 5 (=) ‖2︸                ︷︷                ︸
3 (0,=)
+U, 0) (4.4)
where 0, ?, = are the anchor, positive, and negative samples, respectively, and U is a margin
that is imposed between positive and negative pairs [57].
The number of triplets to choose from grows rapidly with the size of the dataset. Triplet
mining is the process of finding triplets that lead to better model optimization, which are
generally categorized into online and offline methods. The main difference between them
is the time to generate triplets. In online triplet mining, triplets are created within the mini-
batches of data during the training phase. Conversely, the data processing is conducted
before the training in offline generation [58]. We choose the online triplet method since it is
more efficient and is able to produce more triplets for a single batch of inputs [57]. Triplets
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are also mainly divided into three categories based on the definition of the loss: easy triplets,
hard triplets, and semi-hard triplets. Each definition depends on the relative position of the
negative. Selection of the proper triplet greatly influences the performance of the training
model [14]. We compute the triplet loss with semi-hard negative mining, which means the
negative instance is farther than the positive to the anchor, but still has a positive loss due to
the margin we set. We use the TripletSemiHardLoss function in the Tensorflow Addons
library [59].
Figure 4.3. The triplet loss function: to minimize the distance of anchor-
positive and to maximize the distance of anchor-negative. Adapted from [14].
Figure 4.3 describes the training process of triplet loss function: the triplet loss forces
the anchor-positive distance to be smaller than the anchor-negative distance. Therefore,
this training method is determined by triplets that carry hard positive cases (close anchor-
positive) and hard negative cases (close anchor-negative) [60]. These hard samples generate
triples that create gradients with a large magnitude (i.e., the performance of triplets is
related to the training sampling method). We shuffle the training dataset before the batches
are created at each epoch to regularize the model. To help avoid overfitting, it is important
to shuffle the randomly dataset during the training procedure.
4.4 Classification
The embedded vectors produced by the model are compared using Euclidean distance,
and both user identification and verification are performed with only a single template
sample (i.e., one-shot learning scenario).We consider two different adversaries: an adversary
who attempts to identify a user by linking the keystrokes observed in two different TCP
connections; and an adversary who attempts to verify the identity of a user.
37
In user identification, the goal is to correctly match a given connection to one of the
templates. After the training procedure, we compare the feature vector of the test sample
against samples in the training set by using the triplet network. Identification accuracy
is measured by Rank-1, Rank-5, and Rank-50 classification accuracy. Ranked accuracy is
mostly used to measure the accuracy of the neural network model. Rank-1 accuracy is the
percentage of top prediction, which has the same meaning as the standard accuracy. Rank-5
accuracy selects the five highest probabilities. It is common to consider rank-n accuracy
with n>1 when the number of labels is high.
In user verification, the goal is to verify that a given connection belongs to the same user
as a reference connection. It is a binary classification problem to determine whether the
user is genuine or an impostor. We measure verification performance by calculating the area
under the ROC curve (AUC), equal error rate (EER), and accuracy. Figure 4.4 describes the
concepts of EER in (a) and AUC in (b). The EER is the point at which the rates of false
positive and false negative are equal on a distance threshold 3. The lower the EER value,
the higher the accuracy of the model.
Figure 4.4. (a) EER, (b) AUC-receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
(area under the receiver operating characteristics (AUROC))
The ROC curve is a probability curve that consists of the x-axis with TPR and y-axis with
FPR. The AUC is a performance metric obtained by integrating the ROC curve to obtain
the total area under the curve [61]. Whereas EER measures only a single point on the
ROC curve, the AUC captures the complete system performance by considering all distance
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thresholds. The red line in Figure 4.4 represents the perfect classifier where the AUC is 1.
The closer the graph gets to the value of 1, the better the performance we get to distinguish
between classes. We leverage this concept to compare the verification performance with
diverse scenarios.
4.5 Summary
Wehave described the whole parts of ourmethodology over two chapters so far. In summary,
we set two important assumptions for the experiment: 1) a remote adversary can eavesdrop
on traffic from the victim, and 2) the victim utilizes the same TCP connection. From the
data collected by the system we built, we performed Ajax packet detection by leveraging
the patterns of packet timing and size side-channels. Then, we extracted features from
the detection and utilized them as inputs for our model. The model we used is based on
RNN, which is suitable for temporal data. We elaborated on our training methods in regard
to LSTM with diverse techniques and triplet loss functions. After that, we evaluated the
performance of user identification and verification with diverse scenarios. The next chapter
introduces the experimental results for each method we performed.
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This chapter discusses our experimental results and is organized in two parts: Ajax packet
detection, and user identification/verification. In Ajax packet detection, we analyze the
website behavior and compare the relative performance of each detectionmethod. After that,
user identification and verification accuracies are evaluated for several different scenarios.
5.1 Event Packet Detection
There are mainly three approaches for Ajax packet detection that we described in Chapter
3: longest increasing subsequences, dynamic time warping, and inspecting payload. The
user’s typing a search query results in Ajax requests containing a URL parameter that
gradually increases in length, which enables LIS detection to achieve a high accuracy.
However, there are also several exceptions in which LIS detection can fail, including when:
background packets have a similar size (false positive), Ajax packets have a different size
(false negative), and multiple keypress events are buffered into a single Ajax request (a kind
of false negative). Additionally, Ajax packet size could potentially decrease when edits are
made to a partially completed query since we did not exclude Backspace and Delete keys
from our data capture.
The dynamic timewarping approach leverages packet and keystroke timings to minimize the
latency between them. This latency depends on the way Ajax requests are made in response
to user input events, so each website has a different latency. We use DTW as another source
ground truth to evaluate the LIS method since DTW is a verified way to measure time
series similarity by utilizing the concept of sequence alignment. DTW, however, has to deal
with packet jitter since it uses temporal features only. Also, DTW tends to be affected by
generated background traffic. Future work should consider a better way to extract timing for
a more robust alignment, such as comparing the sequence of time intervals.
There are three ways to decrypt packets: using a pre-master secret key, RSA key, or trans-
parent TLS proxy. We use a pre-master secret key, which was obtained by setting the
SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable before starting to capture the traffic. The auto-
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complete feature makes payload detection possible since the client requests an HTTP/2 GET
that contains the partially completed query in the URL after each keypress. Therefore, we
can evaluate the exact performance of each method by inspecting the payload.
5.1.1 Analysis of Website Behavior
We investigate the susceptibility of each website to leak information over encrypted traffic
using Ajax packet timings. We survey and analyze several popular websites that implement
dynamic contents as potential candidates for the experiment: Google Search, DuckDuckGo,
GoogleDocs, and Amazon. We use Arduino, which is an open-source electronics platform
that can read inputs and turn them into outputs [62], to maintain the same condition for user
input (e.g., the keystroke time interval is set between 100ms to 300ms). Figure 5.1 is a part
of the keystroke generation code for Arduino to examine the website behavior.
Figure 5.1. Arduino key generation code
Table 5.1 describes each website’s behavior and detection performance. The TPR of each
detection method is calculated in the same manner: typing the short sentence “typing
behavior,” which consists of short fixed-text input (15 characters) in the Chrome browser.
We use Wireshark and the keylogging software Biologger [63] to compare the timing
between keystrokes and packets. Note that the performance can vary according to several
factors such as the length of data entered and the typing speed.
The websites that we investigated use a callback event model with keypress and XHR rather
than FetchAPI. Also, we can observe thatmultiple keys aremerged into a single packet when
the typing speed exceeds a threshold on several websites. The speed at which this occurs
differs per website: on DuckDuckGo Search (which implements an autocomplete feature
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Table 5.1. Summary of website behavior (1)
Website Event Model Latency (ms) TPR (%) Threshold (ms)LIS DTW
Google keypress (XHR) 10–15 100 86.7 100
DDG keypress (XHR) 10–20 92.3 76.9 300
GoogleDocs keypress (XHR) 200–250 42.9 85.7 2–300
Amazon keypress (XHR) 300–400 93.3 100 100
similar to Google Search) and GoogleDocs (which implements an autosave feature triggered
by keydown events), multiple keys are merged into a single request when keystrokes occur
within less than 300 ms of each other. On the other hand, Google and Amazon merged
multiple keys within a comparatively lower threshold (100ms) into a single packet.
Figure 5.2. Website behavior: packet time interval distribution at Duck-
DuckGo (left) and packet size distribution at GoogleDocs (right)
Figure 5.2 is the histogram of packet time interval distribution at DuckDuckGo (left) and
packet size distribution at GoogleDocs (right). We can observe that the time intervals are
converged at its threshold (300ms), which means it is difficult to distinguish users through
temporal features at DuckDuckGo. This result differs from that of prior work in that a
callback registered to keyup events and did not have such a threshold [19]. DuckDuckGo
seems to have changed its autocomplete function compared to the previous result investi-
gated. In the case of GoogleDocs, the packet sizes do not follow the LIS pattern. The packet
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size is determined not by the query length but by the number of inputs that are contained
in a single packet. Most packet sizes are between 270 and 280 at GoogleDocs. Thus, the
detection accuracy of the LIS approach for GoogleDocs is 42.9%, which is much lower than
other websites.
Furthermore, GoogleDocs and Amazon have much longer latencies compared to other
websites. GoogleDocs is a document collaboration application, which may produce a longer
delay than the autocomplete feature since it does not have to save documents in such a short
time or more time is required to save documents. We also found that the pattern of packets
is different on GoogleDocs depending on its log-in state. When an anonymous user who is
not the owner of the document modifies the shared document, an additional POST packet
is generated at each Ajax packet. The POST packet size is similar to Ajax packets, and this
makes it more difficult to distinguish the Ajax packets based on the packet size. Amazon
would be a good candidate since Ajax packets are almost perfectly detected. On the other
hand, there are also disadvantages in that its latency is unstable as well as the user’s tendency
to search queries on e-commerce sites by using just simple words. Table 5.2 summarizes
the protocols that the website used to generate Ajax packets and the decrypted payload of
Ajax packets. Most websites use the HTTP/2 protocol but some of them still use HTTP like
the Amazon case.
Table 5.2. Summary of website behavior (2)
Website Protocol Payload
Google HTTP2 HEADERS[N]: GET /complete/search?q=...
DDG HTTP2 HEADERS[N]: GET /ac/?q=...
GoogleDocs HTTP2 DATA[N] (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
Amazon HTTP GET /api/2017/suggestions?session-id=...
As we describe in tables 5.1 and 5.2, each website has its own behavior in response to user
input events.
Figure 5.3 is an analysis of web traffic at Google Search: a packet rate per a second (up)
and the result of Ajax packet detection (down). At first, many packets occur due to TLS
handshake (Client/Server Hello - Change Cipher Spec) to establish a connection between
a client and a server and to load a web page at Google. This includes HTTP/2 SETTINGS
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Figure 5.3. Analysis of web traffic: a packet rate per a second (up) and the
result of Ajax packet detection (down)
for initial configuration parameters that affect how endpoints communicate, and HTTP/2
WINDOW_UPDATE to implement flow control [64]. After the page loading, packets tend
to occur the same rate as typing speeds. Not only Ajax packets but also other background
packets are generated by the keystroke inputs. We can also observe the consistent latency
between keypress and packet time, and Ajax packets that have the LIS pattern in Figure
5.3 (down). Note that smaller size packets that occur at the same rate as Ajax packets are
HTTP/2 PING packets.
Each website has its own behavior in response to user input events. Additionally, we found
that the Ajax packets increase by about 20 bytes after typing about 15 characters in Google
Search. This is due to an additional parameter “gs_mss” added to the request URL [19], as
described in Figure 5.4. Despite this exception, Google Search has a comparatively lower
threshold and delay resulting in fewer false negatives. For this reason, we choose Google
Search for our experiment to perform user identification.
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Figure 5.4. An example of Ajax packet pattern in Google Search
Figure 5.5. Query scenarios in diverse user behavior: general behavior(user1)
vs fast typing with error correction(user2)
Figure 5.5 compares general behavior (user1) with fast typing with error correction (user2)
in Google Search, showing that Ajax packet sizes do not always follow the LIS pattern
with a constant rate. Note that we exclude the variance of Ajax packet sizes due to the
“gs_mss” parameter. Ajax packet size could potentially decrease when edits are made to a
partially completed query since we did not exclude Backspace and Delete keys from our
data capture. Therefore, we set the increasing range of LIS for detection as -5 to 20 since
we should consider the additional parameter as well as error correction. These parameters
represent the smallest and largest change, respectively, that subsequences can undergo in
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Ajax packet sizes. This makes the detection algorithm a bit more constrained than LIS.
5.1.2 Ajax Packet Detection Performance
The performance is measured for each detection method. Ground truth is extracted based
on the fact that Google Search Ajax packets contain a “complete” string in the URL of the
HTTP2 GET request. Note that this requires payload inspection and is website dependent.
After that, the accuracy is computed by averaging TPR and TNR. Table 5.3 describes the
statistics of Ajax packet detection for all packets, LIS packets, and DTW packets by the
protocol and header.
Table 5.3. Statistics of Ajax packet detection
Method HTTP/2 (GET / POST / PING / Others) (%) TLSv1.2(1.3) (%)
All 93.4 ( 41.4 / 2.6 / 34.6 / 14.8) 6.6
LIS 99.9 ( 97.3 / 2.6 / 0 / 0) 0.0001
DTW 99.9 ( 84.9 / 0.01 / 14.9 / 0.001) 0.0002
Note that we only focus on TLS packets from source IP (user) to destination IP (Google
Search) while opening the web browser and entering queries. Except for HTTP/2 over TLS,
other TLS packets are mostly used for TLS handshake, which is a negotiation between
browser and server to establish the connection. LIS and DTW did not detect these packets
since the sizes are different from Ajax packets and they are made before any user input
events. HTTP/2 packets mostly consist of GET headers that indicates requests for specified
resources that include the autocomplete feature.
We compare the relative performance of each detection method: LIS, DTW alignment, and
payload inspection. The accuracy, FPR and FNR are reported for LIS using both payload
inspection and DTW alignment as a reference (ground truth), as well as DTW alignment
using payload inspection as a reference. Table 5.4 summarizes these results based on the
dataset we used.
As a result, we can observe that the LIS method records 96.0% accuracy with 6.5% FNR
on average, which is high enough to examine further for user identification by using the
temporal features of detected packets. On the other hand, the result did not show perfect
47
Table 5.4. Summary of Ajax packet detection performance
Method Truth Accuracy FPR FNR
LIS Payload 96.0 1.6 6.5
LIS DTW 96.9 0.38 5.9
DTW Payload 93.0 4.0 10.1
detection due to the various issues mentioned earlier, because of background packets with
similar sizes and some exceptions of Ajax packets with a different size. DTW as another
source of ground truth suffers from different issues, such as packet jitter making detection
more difficult, since it is based only on timing features. A general and more robust method
of Ajax packet detection remains an area for future work.
5.2 User Identification and Verification
After training the model with triplet network, we evaluate the model with data from 500
users. We use a one-shot learning scenario, which means that predictions are made using
only one training sample per user. We compare user identification and verification per-
formance with three different scenarios: all keystroke timings, packet timings on the host,
and packet timings detected by our method. The scenario for packet timings on the host
assumes perfect Ajax packet detection and no additional noise introduced by packet timings.
For the all keystroke timings scenario, we evaluate performance obtained by the TypeNet
model developed in [36], which utilizes more diverse temporal features extracted by two
consecutive keys as well as an additional features for the keycodes. Note that there are 500
users with one training sample and one testing sample, each comprised of 300 keystrokes
in all scenarios.
We consider identification and verification accuracy dependent on three factors: the number
of users, number of detected events, and detection FNR we used. We analyze and compare
the performance by changing these variables. Table 5.5 summarizes the factors that we used
for evaluation.
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Table 5.5. Factors used to evaluate metrics
Subjects Ranges Metrics
Number of users (train) 10k–170k Ranked Accuracy (1,5,50)
Number of users (test) 100–500 Ranked Accuracy (1,5,50)EER
Number of Ajax packets 50–300 Accuracy
Detection FNR 0–100 Accuracy
5.2.1 User Identification
We perform user identification by taking the Euclidean distance between the query sample
and each of the 500 user profiles. We evaluate user identification performance based on the
rank-# classification accuracy, for # ∈ {1, 5, 50}. Rank-1 accuracy represents the rate of
unequivocally matching a query to that of the correct user. Rank-5 and Rank-50 accuracies
represent the rate of placing the correct user’s profile among the top 1% (five profiles) and
10% (50 profiles), respectively, when comparing the query to the 500 user profiles.
Table 5.6. Identification accuracy (Rank-1, 5, 50) and Loss as the number
of users (train) is scaled up (10k-170k)
Number of users (train) Rank-1 Rank-5 Rank-50 Loss
10k 33.2 69.6 98.0 0.63
50k 51.8 82.8 98.8 0.57
100k 50.0 81.2 99.0 0.61
170k 49.0 77.8 98.6 0.66
Table 5.6 describes the Rank-N accuracy with Loss according to the number of users in
the model training set (not the evaluation training set). From 10,000 to 170,000 users we
tested, the accuracy did not differ much, but 50,000 users of the training set recorded
the highest Rank-1 accuracy (51.8%). Moreover, Rank-50 accuracy is not proportional to
Loss or Rank-1 accuracy. In future work, it will be necessary to study the optimal training
sampling method to get higher accuracy in the triplet network.
Figure 5.6 represents the relation between identification accuracy and sample length (left)
and detection rate (right). Aggregating several hundred Ajax packet timings is a key for
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Figure 5.6. Identification accuracy vs sample length (left) and detection rate
(right)
accurate user identification. We scaled the size of each sample (both training and testing)
from 50 packets to 300 packets. Rank-1 identification accuracy steadily increases with the
longer sample lengths, suggesting that higher accuracy could be obtained if more data were
available. Likewise, user identification largely depends on a low FNR in detecting Ajax
packets. This is shown in Figure 5.6 (right), where we evaluate accuracy as the FNR of
detection increases. Rank-1 identification accuracy is halved at approximately 25% FNR.
Figure 5.7 describes each rank-# identification accuracy as the number of users is scaled up
from 100 to 500 for both the timings on host and packet timings scenarios. We can observe
that accuracy for Rank-1 and Rank-5 identification steadily decreases as the number of users
increases. In the case of Rank-50 accuracy, however, it is not proportional to the number
of users, but rather increases about 0.4% after 200 users in packet timings on the host.
Since Rank-50 accuracy matches the answer with any of the 50 highest probabilities in the
model, it is not as sensitive to population size with only a couple hundred users, but could
potentially decrease as the population size increases.
5.2.2 User Verification
User verification is a binary classification problem about whether the user is genuine or an
impostor. We measure verification performance by calculating AUC, EER, and accuracy.
The EER is the point at which the rates of false positive and false negative are equal on
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Figure 5.7. Identification accuracy (Rank-1, 5, 50) as the number of users
(test) is scaled up (100-500)
the ROC obtained by varying a distance threshold 3, which is described in Figure 5.8 (a).
Figure 5.8 (b), (c), (d) describes the EER of each scenario: all timings, packet timings on
the host, and packet timings detected by our method.
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Figure 5.8. Comparison of verification error rate: (a) EER, (b) EER of all
timings, (c) EER of packet timings on the host, (d) EER of packet timings
detected by our method
Figure 5.9 also illustrates each verification accuracy rate and EER as the number of users is
scaled up from 100 to 500 for both the timings on host and packet timings scenarios. While
identification accuracy steadily declines with the additional users, verification performance
does not significantly increase.
Figure 5.10 describes the relation between verification accuracy and sample length (left)
and detection rate (right). Verification accuracy decreases with the shorter sample lengths
by about 75%, which is a similar result of the identification that longer sample lengths
guarantee the higher accuracy. For the detection FNR, verification accuracy declines by
50% as the detection rate decreases, since it is a binary classification problem.
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Figure 5.9. Verification accuracy (left) and EER (right), as the number of
users is scaled up (100-500)
Figure 5.10. Verification accuracy vs sample length (left) and detection rate
(right)
Figure 5.11 depicts the AUC-ROC curve for each scenario. The random classifier would
have an AUC of 0.5, like the blue dotted line in Figure 5.11. We can observe that all AUCs
we measure are near 1, which means having nearly perfect validation performance. Similar
to previous results, the order of performance achieved in each scenario is all timings (0.996),
host timings (0.995), and packet timings (0.989).
5.2.3 Summary
Table 5.7 summarizes user identification and verification performance for three different
scenarios. Rank-1 identification accuracy with packet timings is 49%, while using timings
53
Figure 5.11. AUC-ROC Curves
Table 5.7. Summary of user identification (rank-N classification accuracy)
and verification (accuracy) performances.
Features Identification VerificationRank-1 Rank-5 Rank-50 Accuracy
All timings 87.4 98.2 99.4 98.2
Host timings 59.0 88.6 99.8 97.8
Packet timings 49.0 77.8 98.6 96.0
on the host is 59%. The drop in performance can be attributed to the noise introduced
by packet timings in addition to imperfect Ajax packet detection. However, nearly perfect
rank-50 identification accuracy is achieved, suggesting that the set of user profiles can be
accurately reduced by up to 90%. We also examined the degree to which performances is
affected by three types of factors: the number of users, the number of Ajax packets, and
detection FNR. Although accuracy using timings only on the host is higher than packet





In this chapter, we summarize the research performed and discuss experimental results,
mitigation, and broad implications. Lastly, we draw conclusions and identify areas for
future work.
6.1 Summary
We have demonstrated that patterns of user behavior and identity can be exposed through
side-channel information such as timing and packet size over encrypted dynamic web
traffic. In our experiment, we built a system that can replay keyboard events and capture
the corresponding keystrokes and network traffic. We detected Ajax packets from captured
files based on the identified patterns by using two approaches (i.e., LIS for packet sizes
and DTW for packet timings). Both approaches obtained over a 90% true positive rate on
average in detection, which was high enough to support user identification. We used an
RNN with triplet loss to extract deep temporal features from the detected packet timings
and evaluated the performance. The results of user identification yielded an accuracy of
49.0% for Rank-1, 77.8% for Rank-5, and 98.6% for Rank-50. Verification performance
was measured by EER and accuracy, which was recorded as 4.0% and 96.0%, respectively.
In conclusion, we demonstrated that user identification and verification can be performed
with modest accuracy by using the packet timings.
6.2 Key Takeaways
1. How do the dynamic web services process user input and invoke the requests? The
event processing model represents a way for the browser to recognize input events before
making a request. Google Search, which we used for the experiment, implements a callback
model that invokes requests in accordance with the keypress event occurrence. Also, we
focused on the use of Ajax technology, which supports fast and responsive interactions
on dynamic web use. Ajax provides a better user experience, but it may also increase the
threats related to privacy. When the user input event occurs, an Ajax API such as XHR
or Fetch initiates requests in response to the event and communicates with the server by
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using HTTP. Thus, even a small user input such as one keystroke can trigger web traffic
through the API, which makes dynamic web services more interactive as well as vulnerable
to diverse attacks.
2. Is there anyway to detect user input events over encryptedweb traffic?How accurate
is the detection? The patterns of user input events can be exposed through side-channel
information: timing and packet size. Two primary approacheswere discussed forAjax packet
detection without inspecting the payload: LIS for packet sizes, and DTW, which leverages
keystroke and packet timings. LIS is an algorithm that finding the longest subsequencewhere
the values are increasing. The absolute packet size and the amount of change are different at
each website. Dynamic time warping can measure the similarity between two time series.
We developed this method as a new way for Ajax packet detection, and it is divided into
three main parts: data preprocessing, sequence alignment, and comparison/selection. First
of all, by leveraging keystroke press timing and packet timing, we create two time series into
arrays, convert them to dense arrays, and apply the window function for continuity. After
that, we calculate the latency respectively: using the concept of cross-correlation, setting
the threshold, and using the optimal warping path. Lastly, a final choice for Ajax packets
is made by comparing the result of each calculation. Both LIS and DTW methods could
detect over 93% of Ajax packets at Google, which is high enough to examine further for
user identification.
3. How can a remote adversary take advantage of unintended input-based side-channel
leakages? How does this infringe on user privacy? A remote passive attacker can infer
sensitive information from user inputs or server responses based on the timing and size
side-channels. The sensitive information may include the identity of the user, the device
that the user used, and the contents that the user entered. In this thesis, we focused on
user identification by referring to the temporal features of users’ typing patterns through
Ajax request packets. By leveraging the sequence-based feature extraction model, both
user identification and verification were performed. We compared the result with different
scenarios: using all keystroke timings and packet timings on the host. The performance
of our method was lower than the others, but it was still feasible to identify users, and
high enough to verify users. This user’s identity can be exposed without any agreement
or notification, which can bring more subsequent security challenges such as tracking user





There are two main points that need further examination in our experimental results. First, a
more general and robust method for Ajax packet detection is needed. This requires control
of several different variables when analyzing the network traffic. Depending on the network
access technology that users connect to, the type of devices and browsers they use, and
whether the user logged in or not, the size of packets or the generated background packets
can vary. Other variables, such as packet jitter and noise related to temporal features, can also
affect Ajax packet detection. The accuracy of detection is a combination of all these factors.
The verification of more diverse situations is necessary to perform user identification in a
real world environment.
Next, several results from the user identification and verification processes need additional
analysis. First, user identification and verification performance is not proportional to the
number of users in the training dataset for the feature extractionmodel. The highest accuracy
was obtained when training with 50k users, although this variance may be due to the
selection of users in the training sets. Further examination is needed to determine the
optimal number of training sets in a triplet network. In user identification, we can observe
that Rank-50 accuracy slightly increases as additional test users are added. Also, Rank-50
accuracy of all timings is lower than that of host packet timings. This is not a significant
difference and may be attributed to model variance (e.g., differences in model performance
based on different initial parameters, data shuffling), but needs further examination. In user
verification, accuracy is not consistently proportional to the number of users. The accuracy
fluctuates, and it may likely be attributed to differences among users as a single new user
is added to the population, since it is a binary classification problem. It is also necessary to
consider alternative sampling methods to extract test users from the entire dataset.
6.3.2 Mitigations
Dynamic web content triggered by user input events can leak user identity in encrypted
network traffic. Two key characteristics make this possible: the ability to distinguish Ajax
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packets with high accuracy, presumably through a distinct pattern of packet sizes, and the
preservation of keypress latencies in the Ajax packet time intervals. When we surveyed
potential candidates that exhibit both characteristics, we found that this kind of attack
becomes much more difficult, primarily due to the timing threshold for generating events
on several websites (e.g., DuckDuckGo, GoogleDocs). These sites suggest that a simple
mitigation measure is to implement a timeout mechanism for dynamic content triggered by
user input. In other words, multiple input events are merged into a single Ajax request when
the rate exceeds some threshold. In this way, original keypress latencies are not recoverable
from the Ajax packets so long as typing speed exceeds the timeout. An alternative mitigation
method would be to normalize packet size, making detection more difficult.
6.3.3 Privacy Implications
There are several privacy implications related to this research from the adversary’s point of
view. We can think of the risk to users who access the internet through a public/untrusted
network or the government/business network. Both scenarios still expose the timing or size
side-channel. A remote passive adversary who can observe the generated network traffic on
the same network can analyze user behaviors by detecting Ajax packets, and subsequently
track user actions or devices. This form of tracking users through behavioral patterns is
more dangerous since it does not need explicit tracking techniques, such as leveraging
HTTP cookies [65]. This field has come under increased scrutiny in recent years [65],
[66]. Also, user identification can be leveraged as an intermediate goal to achieve better
personalization or target identification [67]. Behavior information can be combined with
other tools to enhance performance, especially to identify/verify users on a large scale.
6.4 Conclusion and Future Work
Similar to other biometric modalities (e.g., face recognition and gait analysis), the ability
to identify users among encrypted web traffic is a double-edged sword. All users on the
internet may still be exposed to risks and their privacy violated by being tracked. Not all
privacy issues can disappear, but the applications of this research should be a step in the right
direction for enhancing user privacy and designing a more effective defense mechanism.
There are several promising directions for future work. Detecting user behavior in dynamic
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web traffic depends on accurately detecting Ajax packets, which remains a difficult problem
to solve generally. A characterization of dynamic web traffic behavior over a more diverse
set of websites also remains an ongoing area of research. By analyzing the behavior of
more diverse websites and their interactions with browsers, we can measure the degree of
information leakage and figure out how to generate the traffic at each website.
Developing a more robust Ajax packet detection method is also a promising direction for
future work. By leveraging the time intervals, instead of raw timestamps, we may detect
Ajax packets more accurately. This utilizes the concept of a subgraph pattern matching
problem, which is to find all distinct embeddings of a graph pattern from a given large
target graph and a query graph [68]. We can make two sets (N x N), (M x M) by using
a brute force way to calculate each distance between raw timestamps for both keystrokes
and packets, and may find the Ajax packets comparing the values based on the subgraph
matching algorithm, which is described in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1. An example of keystroke and packet time intervals of subgraph
matching problem
In addition, user identification and verification performance can likely be improved, for
instance, by optimizing the rounding base for inputs, the model hyperparameters, and the
training method (e.g., the number of training users, triplet mining). Especially, we found
that we can achieve better results from the optimal rounding base, which can be gained by
analysis of distribution of timing jitter.
Lastly, users on the Tor network, which is an overlay network designed to obfuscate location
[15], [16], may not guarantee anonymity in the presence of dynamic web traffic, since
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Tor still exposes the timing information. Ajax packet detection would be more difficult
due to the normalized packet sizes on Tor, but could potentially be performed through
temporal features rather than size features (e.g., by detecting a page load and selecting
packets that occur at about the same rate as typing speed after that). This form of remote
user identification remains an item for future work.
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